Update 2025-11-28: Tiago has just published a paper that goes into much more detail about the topics he talked about in the episode. Especially if AI is able to translate deliberation into political effect. Check it out:
» http://dx.doi.org/10.5258/SOTON/WSI-WP014

Automatic Transcription: it could contain errors.


ALESSANDRO OPPO (00:00)
Welcome to another episode of Democracy Innovator podcast. Our guest today is Tiago C. Peixoto. I'm very sorry if I mispronounce your name. Thank you for your time. As a first question, I would like to ask you for a short presentation about yourself—your experience and maybe the projects you've been involved in.

TIAGO C. PEIXOTO (00:32)
Yes, so I'm Tiago Peixoto. I'm a visiting professor for the University of Southampton for the Center for Civic Futures, which has Matt Ryan, Paulo Spada, and many people working with Democratic Innovations. I also work at the World Bank. In the past, I did lots of projects related to citizen engagement, but now most of my work related to democracy comes from collaboration with scholars. So, and for disclosure, anything that I say here is my personal opinion, of course, and doesn't regard by any means the work of the World Bank or any of its member countries or its board of directors. So, my very personal opinion.

ALESSANDRO OPPO (01:26)
Sure. And how would you define a democratic system?

TIAGO C. PEIXOTO (01:34)
Well, I'll define a democratic system a bit in this sense. It is always measured against an ideal benchmark, right? And then you have the real existing democracies of what Philippe Schmitter, political scientist, speaks of. But a democratic system is one in which people can shape the decisions that affect their lives and they have enough information about it to shape those decisions, right?

But I think also if we go at the very etymology of democracy, it's not really what people would like to say—"power of the people." "Kratos" is more about the capacity to do things or the capacity to achieve things. So it is, of course, a process that is inclusive in which people can shape the decisions that affect their lives, but they're also capable of achieving things that otherwise they would not be able to achieve. That would be my short definition of it.

ALESSANDRO OPPO (02:54)
Okay, I was thinking because many times I thought in Italian the word "potere" is like, it's like I can—I can do that. And it's very interesting how it is also related to what one person is able to actually do.

TIAGO C. PEIXOTO (03:19)
Yes, yes, it is. Power is the capacity of changing the course of things, right? Or doing things that otherwise would not happen, right? So if you look at some other classical definitions of power, it's the capacity of A to change the course of B, which without A's action would not have changed its course, right? Power in this way is the capacity of doing things that would not be happening if democracy didn't exist.

ALESSANDRO OPPO (04:02)
And thinking about technology and politics and also about the power that we have about shaping the future. Of course, it's a small power. I wonder what kind of society we could have using technology for political purposes. In one way, we could have a very democratic society, and in the other way, a lot of surveillance, you know, all the dystopic movies. So I wonder what is your idea about how can we use technology—that power that we have?

TIAGO C. PEIXOTO (04:51)
Look, I mean, the essence of the state is the legitimacy of the use of force, right? And to be able to use force, the state is always tempted to enter into surveillance mode in one way or another, right? The police have their intelligence services, and that's common, even in democracies, right?

The question is that I think we will always be in a spectrum between a state that is more libertarian or less. You're going to be along that continuum, right? The state might need to do surveillance for security questions and so on and so forth. But the problem is when the state starts to intervene on people's agency or people's freedom, which are inherent to them, right? Because democracy, well, one of the definitions of democracy is the notion of agency, right? It is your freedom to do things that will lead to your greatest fulfillment as a human being, to be able to flourish and grow.

And the problem is when surveillance starts to enter into that. But I mean, the negative effects of technology on democracy—I think it's not that I don't think it's important, but I think it's a field that is already saturated with concerns both in the public and academic sphere. Not that it's not important again, but I think when I talk about the risks, we need to talk about the possibilities. And when we talk about the possibilities of technology in democracy, that's an area that I've been dedicated to, I think, perhaps over the last 25 years.

Look, I think we need to think of technology's role in two areas, from two angles. One would be dedicated to democracy, right? One would be what you could call invited spaces, which are the spaces that exist by the government. So, for example, elections, referenda, initiatives, or consultations that are done by the government. And you have what we would call invented spaces, which are what you could call grassroots or bottom-up activities that are started by citizens. The role of technology in these two is sometimes overlapping, but sometimes it's completely different.

So I think in an invited space, a classic use of technology is, for example, internet voting. It's very well known, and we did some work as well with invited spaces including participatory budgeting. We were some of the first to assess the impacts of that. But I think we don't discuss enough this, particularly when it comes to elections. The impact of technology, and probably the largest documented impact of technology on democracy came from the introduction of electronic voting in Brazil.

Why? Because in Brazil, we had an election that was very complicated. So if you wanted to vote for somebody in the past, you'd have to choose candidates for president and for other positions. You needed to memorize the number of the candidate. You needed to know the number of the candidate. So it was a paper-based process and very complex to do. And what happened in Brazil is that those who had the least education—and of course the poorest, who are also the most economically disadvantaged—most of their votes would be nullified, right, because they wouldn't be able to vote correctly, so to speak.

And that created a huge bias on who got elected in Brazil. This was the case until about two or three decades ago. I don't remember exactly when it was introduced precisely. I think around 1989, so probably three decades ago or a bit after—it doesn't matter. But what happened is that they created electronic ballots in which citizens just would have to go and sometimes they would just put one number and the picture of the candidate would appear and people would say, "Yes, that's the person I want to vote for, right?" What happened is that all of those votes from poor people that were not being counted before started to be counted just because you improved the user interface of voting.

Because the electronic ballots were rolled out in Brazil gradually, you had a natural experimental design. So you could see the effects with the ballot and the effects without the electronic ballot. What one researcher, Thomas Fujiwara, found in one of the most beautiful papers in civic tech, in my opinion, is that in the places where they rolled out the electronic ballot, you had fewer people making mistakes, and then you had more candidates from poor people getting elected. And that led to bigger priorities in legislation and budgets for proper spending. And years later, you even had an impact on health and infant mortality indicators. So there you go. You just moved the ballot from paper to electronic where the picture appears and it's easier to vote. And it changed—I mean, I don't know of any other civic tech that had any other quantifiable impact at a scale as large as a country, like in Brazil, on infant mortality.

I mean, when people talk to me about civic tech, I always think about that case and I say, "Well, if you could get at least one good indicator"—because the bar is set too high—but that's what I'm thinking. Of course, you have other applications and so on and so forth. But then you have the invented spaces, right? Let me still stay in the invited spaces. Then you have what we call invited spaces, but there are still participatory democracy activities.

ALESSANDRO OPPO (15:27)
What makes people participate? Why do you think people want to participate in democracy? Is it because they don't trust the government, or is it something else?

TIAGO C. PEIXOTO (15:45)
Well, there are several reasons why people participate. First, there's economic inequality. When people feel that they're being left behind or that the government is not responding to their needs, they want to participate to have a voice. Second, there's a psychological benefit. People want to feel heard and want to have agency in the decisions that affect their lives.

Third, there's a sense of community. When people participate in democratic activities, they feel like they're part of something larger than themselves. They feel like they're contributing to something meaningful. And fourth, there's distrust in institutions. When people don't trust the government or other institutions, they want to participate to hold them accountable.

So it's a combination of factors. Economic conditions, psychological needs, the desire for community, and distrust in institutions all play a role in motivating people to participate in democracy.

ALESSANDRO OPPO (16:30)
And what about the experiments that are being done? Like participatory budgeting, citizens' assemblies, and other experimental platforms for participation?

TIAGO C. PEIXOTO (16:45)
Yes, so there are many experiments happening around the world. Participatory budgeting is one of the most well-known. It started in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 1989. The idea is that citizens get to decide how a portion of the public budget is spent. It's a very powerful tool because it gives people real power—it's not just consultation, but actual decision-making.

Citizens' assemblies are another experiment. These are groups of randomly selected citizens who come together to deliberate on important public issues. They receive information, they hear from experts, they discuss among themselves, and then they make recommendations. This is based on the idea that when people have time and good information, they can make thoughtful decisions.

There are also digital platforms for participation, online consultations, e-petitions, and many other tools. The advantage of these digital tools is that they can reach many people and they're relatively easy to use. The disadvantage is that they can be subject to manipulation, they can amplify certain voices while silencing others, and they don't guarantee that the government will actually respond.

ALESSANDRO OPPO (17:50)
And what do you think about the effectiveness of these tools? Do they actually make a difference?

TIAGO C. PEIXOTO (18:05)
That's a critical question. The honest answer is that many of these tools have not lived up to their promises. Participatory budgeting has had varying degrees of success. In some places, it has led to real changes in how budgets are allocated. In other places, it has become more of a symbolic gesture.

Citizens' assemblies have shown promise, but they're not a silver bullet. They can produce thoughtful recommendations, but whether those recommendations are actually implemented by governments is a different question.

Digital platforms are even more challenging. While they can mobilize large numbers of people, the quality of participation is often low. And perhaps most importantly, many governments simply don't respond to these participatory processes in meaningful ways.

So the real challenge is not building better participation tools or platforms. The real challenge is making governments actually responsive to participation. If governments don't respond, then participation becomes meaningless.

ALESSANDRO OPPO (28:58)
So you're saying that the technology and the platforms are not the real issue?

TIAGO C. PEIXOTO (29:15)
Exactly. I think we've been too focused on building more participation platforms. The technology of participation is relatively easy. What's difficult is making a difference out of participation. It's about connecting participation to actual power and decision-making.

And here's where I think about power, argumentation, and social movements. Participation alone doesn't change anything if it's not backed by some form of power or pressure. And that's where social movements come in.

ALESSANDRO OPPO (29:50)
Tell me more about that. What's the connection between participation, power sharing, argumentation, and social movements?

TIAGO C. PEIXOTO (30:10)
So, power sharing is essential to democracy. But power is not given freely. Those who have power are generally reluctant to share it. So how do you get those in power to actually share power?

First, through argumentation and deliberation. You make the case that sharing power will lead to better outcomes, more legitimacy, better governance, and so on. But argumentation alone is usually not enough.

Second, through creating pressure. And that's where social movements come in. Social movements represent collective action by citizens who are pushing for change. They create political pressure. They make the costs of not reforming high enough that those in power feel they have no choice but to respond.

So the relationship is this: participatory spaces and mechanisms are important because they provide a venue for deliberation and argumentation. But they need to be connected to broader social movements that create the political pressure necessary for actual change.

Protests, civil disobedience, strikes, boycotts—these are all forms of social movement activity that signal to those in power: "If you don't address these issues, if you don't reform, you're going to face increasing pressure and instability." And it's that pressure that actually forces change.

ALESSANDRO OPPO (31:50)
So are you saying that peaceful protest is necessary for democratic change?

TIAGO C. PEIXOTO (32:05)
I'm saying that some form of pressure or threat is necessary. I'm not necessarily saying violence is required. In fact, the most successful social movements in history have been nonviolent. Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Mandela—they all used nonviolent methods.

But they were all in a sense "troublemakers." They challenged the status quo. They created disruption. They made it clear that the situation was unsustainable. That's the kind of pressure I'm talking about.

So to be clear: I'm not advocating for violence. But I am saying that those in power need to feel a credible threat—that if they don't reform, if they don't share power, they're going to lose all their power. That's what creates the political pressure necessary for change.

ALESSANDRO OPPO (49:22)
You mentioned global social movements. How do those work? And what's the difference between global movements and local or national movements?

TIAGO C. PEIXOTO (49:45)
Yes, so global social movements are increasingly important. We did a study looking at e-petitions on change.org, and we found something interesting. Some governments that were not responsive to domestic pressure actually became more responsive when they saw that there was global mobilization around an issue.

There's a concept called the "boomerang dynamic." The idea is that if domestic pressure fails, activists throw it out internationally, and when that global pressure comes back, it can influence the government. It's like a boomerang—it goes out and comes back.

Now, what we found is that this boomerang dynamic works particularly well for non-democratic states. Non-democracies actually care quite a lot about their international reputation. So global pressure can be quite effective.

Interestingly, in democratic states, we found the opposite pattern. Democratic governments are much more responsive to their national constituents than to global opinion. Which makes sense because democratically elected leaders need to answer to the voters who elected them.

But still, global movements are important because they can create solidarity, they can amplify messages, and they can create pressure on a global scale.

ALESSANDRO OPPO (53:25)
So if we think about the next 10 or 20 years, how do you think the political system will evolve? You mentioned earlier that you used to have a lot of trust in participatory budgeting, but then it didn't quite deliver on its promises. Do you have thoughts on what a good political system might look like in the future?

TIAGO C. PEIXOTO (53:55)
Yes, so if you ask me what I would prefer, I would prefer that every country would have a bicameral system in which one part of that bicameral system is composed of elected people and another part is composed of randomly selected people. I totally subscribe to that model.

What I disagree with is how we get there. The question is not what the ideal system looks like—many people agree on that. The question is how do you actually achieve that change?

And my answer is: you have to work with social movements. You need people who are willing to push for change, who are willing to challenge the status quo. And you need them to be connected to the field of democratic innovations, to understand that there's not one good solution but a repertoire of solutions.

But fundamentally, social movements are essential. They might not be sufficient on their own, but they are absolutely necessary.

ALESSANDRO OPPO (56:19)
So as a final message, what would you say to people who are working on participatory budgeting, or who are coding new tools, or who are involved in democratic innovations in some way?

TIAGO C. PEIXOTO (56:45)
Well, let me start with people who are coding or building new tools. My message is: don't build another participation platform. Seriously. Please, not another deliberation platform. There are plenty of them already.

The reason is that the technology of participation is easy. Many well-funded organizations are already working on that. What's difficult is making a difference out of participation.

So if I were coding a tool, I would ask: How do I get the government to respond? Why is the government failing to respond to something? If you want to create participation, start with understanding why the government is not responding. Because if the government was working perfectly, people wouldn't feel the need to participate.

So I would start by understanding the problem—why is the government failing?—and then I would build a tool that addresses that specific problem. I would think about outcomes, not means. I would ask: What is the result I want to achieve? And then I would work backwards from there.

If I were working on participatory budgeting or any other participatory mechanism, I would try to connect it with broader social movements. How can I connect the energy and the potency of people in social movements with the structured spaces of participation like citizens' assemblies and participatory budgeting? How can we make them stronger together?

And here's an insight from Obama that I think is very relevant: "First, get people on your side." Don't get too focused on the specifics of what type of democracy or participation you're advocating for. First, get people. Build a movement. And then you can discuss the details.

As Marshall Ganz would say, as Mandela would say, the key is to get people. It's difficult enough to find somebody who cares about democracy at all. So don't get too picky about what type of democracy. First build the movement, get the people, and then you can work on the specifics.

So to summarize: Think about outcomes, not just tools. Think about power and how to create pressure for change. Connect participation mechanisms to broader social movements. And focus on getting people—building broad coalitions rather than getting bogged down in the specifics.

ALESSANDRO OPPO (01:01:00)
Thank you so much. This was very interesting. I still have a lot of questions in my mind, but I think we've covered a lot of ground.

TIAGO C. PEIXOTO (01:01:28)
Thank you. It was my pleasure. We can do other questions another time if you'd like. It was fun.

ALESSANDRO OPPO (01:05:40)
Thank you for your time and for these insights.